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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The issues are procedural as to matters of law and 
the exclusion of testimony. That is whether as a matter of 
law the Plaintiff is entitled to renew a series of judgments 
for past due support and whether the Court may refuse to 
set aside judgment or honor another Courts ruling on the 
issues there presented without receiving evidence. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On July 6, 1978 Judge G. Hal Taylor refused to set 
aside a Default Judgment renewing a 1970 Judgment of 
$11,705.00 against Defendant, in case No. - 241218. 
On September 8, 1977 Judge Jay E. Banks entered an 
Order that no judgment should be granted on the prior judgments 
heretofore entered in case No. 117445, which was the divorce 
case in which the support was ordered and the 1970 judgment 
was granted. 
STATEMENTS OF FACTS 
On February 11, 1959 Plaintiff was granted a decree of 
divorce in case No. 117445 under the terms of which she was 
awarded custody of the two children one a baby and the other 1 
year old. Defendant was ordered to pay $50.00 per month per 
child and $50.00 per month alimony. On May 5, 1966 Plaintiff 
received judgment for $300.00 arrearages and alimony terminated. 
On November 14, 1966 Judgment for $500 was entered for past due 
and owing support payments. On February 4, 1970 Judgment was 
entered for $11,705.00 representing the total amount by which 
Defendant is delinquent in alimony and support payments since J 
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commencement of this action in April, 1959 to and including 
December 31, 1969. On March 30, 1976 it was ruled that the 
Defendant still owed $11,705.00 on the Judgment and was $25 
behind on current support and one child was self supporting so 
child support should terminate for her and increase to $75.00 
for the other. An Order to Show cause was served on Defendant 
for March 30, 1977 but service was quashed March 7, 1977. 
Plaintiff served another Order to Show Cause for April 25, 1977 
bearing civil No 117445. Attached thereto without a different 
number was a summons and complaint on which No. 241218 was 
whited out asking for renewal of the $11,705.00 judgment. 
The question of the $11,705 renewal was argued to Judge 
Banks between April and August of 1977 on case No. 117445 
and a part of his order provided "No judgment is granted on 
judgments in arrears or heretofore entered." There were 
reviews of the case November 4, 1977 and May 4, 1978 at which 
last hearing Defendant was served with an order in supplemental 
proceedings for the $11,705.00 judgment bearing case no 117445. 
and responded to with still no knowledge of the other case. 
On June 27th an answer, motion and affidavit were filed in 
No. 241218 to set aside the judgment under Rule 60 and Rule 
of the Utah Rules of Civil procedure. On July 6, 1978 Judge 
Taylor refused to set aside the judgment ruling that as a 
matter of law the defenses raised were not sustainable. 
A timely appeal was filed in case No. 241218 by the 
Defendant. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to have the Default Judgment set 
aside in No. 241218 and a ruling that as a matter of law 
Judgments are barred after 8 years and cannot be renewed. 
And for an estoppel against the Plaintiff requiring that 
the Order of Judge Banks be honored and No 241218 be dismissed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
There was no transcript prepared as no record was 
taken in the Motion Division of the Third District Court 
before G. Hal Taylor on July 6, 1978. All references to the 
record will refere first to the case number and then the page 
of the applicable pleadings. 
All of the support obligation of the Defendant to 
plaintiff has terminated on"her remarriaqe August 21, 1964. 
(117445 page 98 paragraph 3) All support obligation for t~o 
two children of the marriaae has terminate~ for Rmela March 30, 
1976 (117445 page 109 paragraph 3) and for Penny December 1976. 
(117445 page 146 paragraph 5). The Defendant has payed all 
that was required of him and served 3 days in jail,except he 
has made no payments on the Judgment for $11,705.00 and costs. 
Said judgment was entered on February 4, 1970 from a hearing 
of February 2, 1970 and represents the total amount by which 
Defendant was delinquent in alimony and support payments since 
the commencement of 117445 in April 1959 to and including 
December 31, 1969. (117445 page 84 paragraph 2} and included 
"all prior judgments heretofore entered in this matter." 
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The prior judgments included alimony and support 
payments as they became due and as later reduced to judgments 
for $300.00 on May 5, 1966 ( No. 117445 page 16 paragraph 1) 
and for $500.00 on November 14, 1966 which seems to include 
the prior $300.00 judgment. (No. 117445 page 55 paragraph 1) 
The Order reads " .•. $500.00 for past due and owinq support 
payments, ••. " 
Defendant was sentenced and served 3 days in jail 
for contempt for failure to make payments on the Judgment. 
(No. 117445 page 146 paragraph 6) 
Defendant was served an Order to Show Cnuse set for 
hearing March 7, 1977 which was quashed for procedural defects. 
(No. 117445 page 13~). He was served identical pleadings 
on April 18, 1977 (No. 117445 page 138) to which were appended 
summons and complaint on which the number 117445 was typed 
but which had been partially whited out with correction fluid 
and no new number showing written in as is on the summons and 
complaint in No 241218 pages 3 and 2. (~o. 241218 Exhibit 1-D 
on page 16) 
Defendant and his attorney believed they were trying 
the question of renewing again the $11,705.00 judgment all 
throughout the proceedings of case No. 117445 and argued the 
question to the Honorable Jay E. Banks and entered an order 
accordingly on September 14, 1977 in which Findings of Fact 
were made about the $11,905.00 (No 117445 page 147 paragraph 11 
and the Conclusion of Law that "4. No judgment should be arante: 
on the Prior iudaments heretofore entered ... " (117445 Pace 149 '1 4 
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No objectioo "MlS:rrede tctthe September 8. 1977 Order of 
Judoe Banks nor was an appeal taken from that rulino. The 
Plaintiff quietly took default on case No. 241218 on July 6 
1977 for the same $11,705.00. (No. 241218 page 7) making 
the same mistake throughout of appending the wrong case 
number under which he served the Defendant. No notice of 
the judgment was sent until an Order in Supplemental Proceedings 
again bearing No. 117445 was served upon Defendant April 4, 
1978. (No. 117445 pages 152, 153, and 154) Objection thereto 
was filed May 11, 1978 still without understanding of the 
fact that there was a second action. (No. 117445 page 155) 
On May 25, 1978 a letter giving notice of the Judgment 
in 241218 was delivered to Defendants attorney. (Ex A appended) 
An answer, affidavit and motion to set aside the Judgment were 
filed and subsequently argued to Judge G. Hal Taylor on 
July 6, 1978. He denied the motion based upon a finding that; 
1. Defendant admitted the allegations of the complaint in 
his answer. 2. The complaint asserts a.cause of action. 
3. The objection to the 1970 judgment that it was induced by 
threat and coersion without benefit of counsel should have 
been raised in 1970. 4. The bar of the statute of limitations 
78-12-22 UCA and that no action to renew judgments is authorized 
by the Utah Code was denied as a matter of law. 5. The prior 
ruling by Judge Banks denying the renewal was denied as a matter 
of law as a defense and 6. The claim of double jeopardy of 
person or property was denied as a matter of law. Thus he said 
that even if the ·oefault were set aside on the basis of Rule 4 e 
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lAMES BRUCE READING 
jOHN SPENCU SNOW 
Reading & Snow 
ATIORNEYS AT LAW 
Exhibit A 
1408 South 1100 East • Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
Telephone 487-5463 
May 25, 1978 
Don L. Bybee, Esq. 
431 South 300 East, #202A 
Salt La~e City, Utah 84111 
Re: Mason v. Mason 
Dear Don: 
I have personally served your client George 
Stephen Mason with a Motion for Order in Supple-
mentary Proceeedings. The civil number which was 
used on the face of the pleading was D-117445. 
You make the allegation that the Judgment of Feb-
ruary 4, 1970 was not renewed within the period 
of eight years. Please be advised that your 
client was personally served with a Complaint and 
Swrunons· fer the renewal of this Judgment. P. 
Judgment was entered renewing the former Judgment 
of February 4, 1970 on the 6th day of July, 1977. 
The civil number for the renewed Judgments is 
D-241218. The motion for Order in Supplementary 
Proceedings should have reflected civil number 
D-241218 rather than D-117445. 
SiJ~:rel~~ 
~PENCER SNOW 
DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I delivered a true 
and exact copy of the foregoing letter,to Don 
L. Bybee, at 431 South 300 East #202A, Salt 
Lake City, Ctah, on the 25th day of May, 1978. 
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or Rule 60 (b) (1) no viable defenses were asserted. (241218 p 17) 
From this ruling the Defendant appealed. 
POINT I 
INSTALLMENTS OF ALIMONY AND SUPPORT BECOME VESTED WHEN 
THEY BECOME DUE AND ARE RENEWED WHEN REDUCED TO JUDGMENT. ORDERS 
ALSO ARE THE SAME AS JUDGMENTS AND BOTH MAY BE ENFORCED AS THO 
JUDGMENTS BY THE FILING OF AN AFFIDAVIT THAT THEY ARE NOT PAYED. 
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS OF EIGHT YEARS APPLIES 
FROM THE DATE THE INSTALLMENT BECOMES DUE. 
The Defendant was ordered to pay installments of support 
and alimony from the period February 11, 1959 thru May 5, 1966 
during which period he slipped $300.00 behind. By November 14, 
1966 he had fallen $500.00 behind and by February 4, 1970 he had 
gotten behind by $11,705.00 out of a total bill of $23,225.00 
to date. There is no dispute that the installments were all 
vested when they became due. See Bates v. Bates, 560 P.2d 706 
in which the Utah Supreme Court stated 
citing: 
see also: 
"(2) The law of this state is 
clear: Installments of alimony 
become vested when they become due, 
and the court has no power to modify 
the decree as to them. Therefore, 
interest accrues at the legal rate. 
Myers v. Myers, 62 Utah 90, 218 P. 123 (1923) and 
Cole v. Cole, 101 Utah 355, 122 P. 2d 201 (1942) 
Scott v. Scott, 430 P. 2d 580 to the effect that 
alimony and support payments become unalterable debts in Utah 
as they accrue even as to forei~n orders. 
By holding a hearing the Court is simply fixing the 
amount specificaly due and payable in order that action can be 
brought in this state or another to enforce the vested amount. 
Hunt v. Monroe,· 32 u. 428, 91 P. 269. On that basis the Utah 
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Courts have been applying the eight year statute of limitation 
and not allowing an Order or Judgment for support accrued more 
than eight years before the Motion or Complaint is filed. If 
the accrued installments are not judgments then the 4 year statu:, 
of limitations for open accounts or the 6 year limitation for 
agreements in writing would apply. By some quirk of common 
practice the Utah Courts have then been recognizing the "new" 
Judgment or Order for an additional eight years. Section 
78-12-1 Of the Judicial Code provides: 
78-12-1 Time for commencement of actions generally. 
Civil actions can be commenced only within the periods 
prescribed in this chapter, after the cause of action 
shall have accrued, except where in special cases 
a different limitation is prescribed by statute. 
78-12-22 Within eight years -Within eight years: 
An action upon a judgment or decree of any court 
of the United States. or of any state or territory 
within the United States. 
An action to enforce any liability due or 
to become due, for failure to provide support or 
maintenance for ~ependent children. 
The Utah Supreme Court in construing the phrase 
"to become due" in the Edwena Nielsen v. Steven Hansen case 
No 14628 said "The meaning of the phrase "to become due" 
is that when an amount is to become due in the future, suit 
must be begun within eight years after it accrues. The statute 
of limitations thus applies equally to a liability which will 
accrue in the future as it does to one which is now due. 
see Martinez v. Romero 558 P. 2d 510. 
As Justice Maughan so clearly stated then "Succinctly 
stated, the statute and Martinez clearly state: if eight 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
years have elapsed, since the inception of the claim, any 
action to enforce any liability due or to become due, for 
failure to provide support for dependent children, is barred •.. " 
There also is no argument possible that payment 
has tolled the statute of limitations as the Utah Supreme Court 
clearly ruled in the case of Yergensen v. Ford, 16 u. (2d) 397, 
402 P. 2d 696 that 78-12-44 that the common law rule which tolled 
the limitation period in case of acknowledgment or part 
payment is limited to contract actions. Former 104-37-6 
permitted enforcement of judgment after lapse of eight years. 
Rev. St 1933, 104-2-21, 104-37-1, 104-37-6 However this 
Court in 1942 in the case of Youngdale v. Burton, 128 P. 2d 1053 
ruled that action could not be taken to enforce a judgment after 
the period of limitation had run. The Court in dicta says that 
104-37-6 is the only reason all judgments do not become permanently 
dead and ineffective for all purposes except as a possible cause 
of action for suit on the judgment eight years after entry thereof. 
No justification for that statement is given and counsel for the 
Defendant can find no current Utah Law which authorized the 
bringing of a cause of action on a Judgement before or after the 
8 year statute of limitations runs. There are numerous references 
to that procedure in the cases but Defendant submits the legislature' 
. I 
spoke plainly in 78-12-22 in order to clear the record of stale 
impedaments to property transferes, insure diligence in the 
prosecution of claims and finally put matters to rest. This 
Defendant has been hounded for over 12 years since the first 
installment vested and over 8 years since the 3rd renewal and 
Plaintiff wants 8 more years and then 8 more years, etc. 
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POINT II 
WHERE A JUDGE OF THE SAME COURT OR OF A COURT OF 
COMPETENT JURISDICTION HAS RULED UPON A QUESTION THAT RULING 
SHOULD BE RES -JUDICATA AND IS A VALID DEFENSE TO ANOTHER 
ACTION EXCEPT ON APPEAL 
In the Instant case the Defendant raised the ruling 
of Judge Banks that action on the Judgments is barred as an 
affirmative defense as is provided in the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure Rule 8 (c). The record in case No 117445 was presented: 
to Judge Taylor and he read the September 8, 1977 Order of 
non suit on renewing of the 1970 Judgment. He then ruled as 
a matter of Law that the Order did not say what it puported to 
say and that as a matter of Law it was not a valid defense and 
thus there was no reason to reach the questions of excusable 
neglect or fraud raised in the motion to set aside the judgment. 
The term Res judicata means that the matter has been 
adjudged, or is a thing judicially acted upon or decided; and 
is a rule that a final decree or judgment on the merits by a 
court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive or rights of 
parties or their privies in all later suits on points and matters' 
determined in the former suit. American S.S. Co. v. Wickwire 
Spencer Steel Co., D.C.N.Y., 8 F. Supp. 562. To be applicable it 
requires identity in the thing sued for as well as identity of 
cause of action, of persons and parties to the action and of 
quality in persons for or against whom the claim is brought. 
The sum and substance of the whole rule is that a matter 
once judicially decided is finally decided and if plaintiff 
attached a complaint bearing the same case designation to 117445 
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and the same parties as in this case argued that point and 
Plaintiff quietly sat on her aff~rmative defense that she had 
a default judgment and Judge Banks ruled that no judgment would 
be granted on the $11,705.00 1970 judgment then that ruling 
would be an affermative defense in a subsequent hearing on 
case no 241218 if the Judgment were set aside and Judge Taylor 
committed error in not looking to the fraud or excusable neglect 
and setting aside the default judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiff inadvertenti1 mis~ead the Defendant in 
not having the correct number on the summon·s and complaint in 
.. 
case number 241218 and consequently mislead his attorn;y by 
attaching them to the back of an Order to Show cause which was 
a duplicate of one already in the file and previously argued 
and clearly labeled 117445. The parties fought case 117445 
with great vigor yet nowhere in the proceedings did Plaintiff 
advise defendant of the default even during arguments on the 
propriety of renewing again for the 3rd or fourth time the old 
judgment for attorney fees and $11,705.00. That would be grounds 
for setting aside the judgment and reaching the affirmative 
defenses that the matter had already been ruled upon in an 
advesary proceeding involving the same ?artie~ or that the 
statute of limitations barred further action on the claim. 
Both of which defenses would justify this court in setting 
aside the judgment in case 241218 and ruling as a matter of 
law that that complaint be dismissed with prejudice. The other 
affirmative defenses would require some proof of facts and 
11 
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·1l L 
hence are not argued in this brief to the Court. 
Counsel for Defendant is aware that this Court must 
make all presumptions in favor of the prevaling party in the 
lower proceedings and will only overturn a ruling where there 
is a clear abuse of discretion. However it is urged in this 
case that there has been such a clear abuse and that Defendant 
is entitled to have complaint in case 241218 dismissed or 
remanded for dismissal after the default judgment is set aside. 
RECEIVED 3 copies this 
5th day of January, 1979. 
12 
Respectfully submitted 
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